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Abstract 
Economists have recently proposed a theory of identity economics in which behavior is 
understood to be shaped by motivations associated with identities that people share with 
others. At the same time psychologists have proposed a theory of identity leadership in which 
leaders’ influence flows from their creation and promotion of shared identity with followers. 
Exploring links between these approaches, we examine the impact of very high leader pay on 
followers’ identification with leaders and perceptions of their leadership. Whereas traditional 
approaches suggest that high pay incentivizes leadership, identity-based approaches argue 
that it can undermine shared identity between leaders and followers and therefore be 
counterproductive. Supporting this identity approach, two studies provide experimental and 
field evidence that people identify less strongly with a CEO who receives high pay relative to 
other CEOs and that this reduces that leader’s perceived identity leadership and charisma. 
The implications for leadership, economics, and organizations are discussed. 
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Identity Economics Meets Identity Leadership:  
Exploring the Consequences of Elevated CEO Pay 
Leader pay is a topical issue in contemporary organizations and society, and it 
continues to be the focus of heated debate that rages around the impact that leaders’ pay has 
on their motivation and performance (for reviews, see Garbers & Konradt, 2014; Gerhart & 
Fang, 2015; Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005). In this regard, the pay that Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) receive for their work has been a particular focus of both academic and 
public interest (Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005; Gabaix, & Landier, 2008; Hacker & Pierson, 
2010; Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman, & Yammarino, 2004; Stanford Graduate School of 
Business, 2016; Wall Street Journal, 2014). The breadth of public interest in this topic 
suggests that the implications of CEO pay may not be limited to the individual CEO. As we 
discuss in detail below, there are reasons for expecting that it may even have implications for 
an organization’s employees, such that highly paid CEOs find it harder to connect with, and 
consequently lead, their employees. If true, this implies that decisions about CEO 
remuneration need to balance the implications of this for the CEO against those for the rest of 
the organization.   
In the present research, we review identity economics and identity leadership 
perspectives, attending particularly to their implications for the relationship between the 
amount CEOs are paid and their capacity to lead. Importantly, as we will show, the resulting 
predictions sit in sharp contrast to those generated by traditional economic and psychological 
models of leadership. In particular, where incentive and shareholder value models support the 
expectation that increasing CEO pay ensures that CEOs will more effectively motivate their 
employees to work to achieve the organization’s goals, the identity model supports the 
expectation that increasing CEO pay makes salient “us” versus “them” distinctions which 
erode their ability to connect to, and consequently influence, their workers.  
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In order to test these alternative expectations, we examine whether perceivers’ identification 
with CEOs and perceptions of their identity leadership and charismatic appeal are positively 
or negatively affected by their level of pay relative to their peers. This research makes at least 
three important contributions. First, it presents a framework that, for the first time, articulates 
the alignment and complementarity of identity economics and identity leadership 
perspectives and tests this alignment empirically by looking at the issue of leader 
remuneration. Second, it expands upon the literature on identity leadership by proposing that 
pay contributes both to people’s identification with a leader and to their perceptions of the 
leader’s capacity to cultivate a sense of “we” in the organization. Third, it contributes to 
theoretical understanding of charisma by advancing the proposition that leader charisma is 
not only an input into effective leadership but also a consequence of attributions that people 
make on the basis of social contextual information — in this case, information about leader 
pay.  
Identity Economics and Organizational Behavior 
In recent years economists have argued for a new theoretical understanding of their 
discipline in which economic behavior is understood to be shaped by the identities of 
economic agents and the norms, values and tastes associated with those identities (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2000, 2005, 2010; see also Zehnder, Herz, & Bonardi, 2017). As Akerlof and 
Kranton (2010) observe in Identity Economics, this framework departs from traditional 
economics in arguing that people’s economic choices are not simply a function of the 
personal utility of those choices, but also derive from their group memberships and the place 
of those groups within the prevailing social context. By way of example, Akerlof and 
Kranton (2010, p.10) note that while economists have argued that people’s behavior is 
determined by a desire to be (and be seen to be) “fair”, what a person deems to be fair is 
likely to be shaped by the groups that they are members of and the context in which those 
IDENTITY ECONOMICS MEETS IDENTITY LEADERSHIP 5 
groups find themselves. For example, conservatives and liberals differ in their beliefs about 
what a fair tax system should look like, and these beliefs also vary as a function of the 
country in which they are articulated (e.g., the US vs. Sweden). People also tend to see what 
is fair for ingroups (“us”) as quite different from what is fair for outgroups (“them”) —
 generally having a more generous and inclusive sense of fairness in the former case (Platow, 
Hoar, Reid, Harley, & Morrison, 1997; Ullrich, Christ, & van Dick, 2009; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). This model is consistent with the identity model of moral behavior by Bénabou and 
Tirole (2011) which suggests that individuals’ (personal or social) identities have important 
implications for the moral value that people attach to assets such that people see significant 
value in assets that consistent with who they are, while discarding the value of assets that are 
identity-inconsistent.   
Akerlof and Kranton (2010) note that this way of thinking also has quite radical 
implications for our understanding of organizational behavior. In particular, they note that 
economic theory has traditionally argued that the key to a successful organization is an 
incentive structure of wages and bonuses that serves to appropriately incentivize appropriate 
forms of action (e.g., hard work, loyalty). Identity economics, however, “draws a near 
opposite conclusion” — namely that “if employees care only about wages and bonuses, they 
will game the system. They will do what it takes to earn the bonus, but not necessarily what 
is good for citizens of the firm” (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010, p.14). The recipe for success that 
they set out is thus very different to that prescribed by standard economic theory: 
Identity economics suggests that a firm operates well when employees identify with it and 
when their norms advance its goals. Because firms and other organizations are the 
backbone of all economies, this new description transforms our understanding of what 
makes economies work or fail. (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010, p.15) 
Unpacking these ideas further, Akerlof and Kranton note that the utilities of working 
for an organization differ significantly for those who identify highly with that organization 
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and for those who don’t. In particular, whereas low-identifiers (termed ‘outsiders’) lose 
utility if they work hard, high identifiers (‘insiders’) gain utility the harder they work. A key 
point here, then, is that organizations will generally become more efficient to the extent that 
their employees are high identifiers who are intrinsically motivated by a desire to contribute 
to positive organizational outcomes (rather than extrinsically motivated by the prospect of 
financial reward; Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Ryan & Deci, 2000). The approach also suggests 
that there is value in organizations investing in efforts to change workers’ identities — so that 
low identifiers who are largely motivated by incentives are transformed into high identifiers 
who are motivated by common bonds of pride, loyalty, and love (Akerlof & Kranton, 2010, 
pp.40-43). Significantly too, these are predictions that are lent support by a wealth of 
organizational research which points to links between employees’ organizational 
identification and their motivation and performance (for reviews see Ellemers, de Gilder, & 
Haslam, 2004; Haslam, 2001; Tyler & Blader, 2000; van Dick, 2001; van Knippenberg, 
2000; and for recent meta-analytic evidence, see Lee, Park, & Koo, 2015; Ng, 2015). 
Identity Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Identity leadership theorizing derives from the social identity approach which 
comprises both social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory 
(Turner, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). A core tenet of this 
approach is that a person can derive a sense of who they are not only from perceiving self as 
an individual by homing in on what makes them different from other individuals (their 
personal identity) but also from perceiving self as a member of a group and homing in on 
what makes their group different from other (out)groups (their social identity). Furthermore, 
this approach argues that when people see themselves as part of a group and identify with it, 
then this has qualitatively different consequences for their feeling, motivation, and behavior. 
In this way, groups and the sense of identity that people derive from being part of a group are 
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fundamental to people’s psychology in being a basis not only for a range of important 
psychological resources (such as belonging, meaning, control; e.g., Greenaway, Cruwys, 
Haslam, & Jetten, 2016) but also for motivation and behavior. In particular, when, and to the 
extent that, people define themselves in terms of a shared social (i.e., group-based) identity 
they will be motivated not to find out who they are as individuals and to advance their 
personal interests but to discover what it means to be a member of the group (‘we’) and then 
to act in ways that accord with this understanding of who they are and to advance their shared 
group interests (Turner, 1982). 
Against this background, and as Zehnder et al. (2017) observe, the question of how 
organizations might cultivate identification among their members is therefore a critical one. 
The answer, they suggest, is through effective leadership. This too is the conclusion reached 
by Haslam, Reicher, and Platow (2011), in The New Psychology of Leadership where the 
researchers argue — and demonstrate — that identity leadership is an important determinant 
of key outcomes in social and organizational spheres.  
More specifically, Haslam and colleagues challenge traditional models of leadership 
which see this as residing predominantly in the characteristics of leaders (e.g., their 
personality, style, and behaviour) and suggest instead that leaders’ capacity to influence 
followers (which is the true test of leadership; Bennis, 2003) flows from their capacity to 
create, represent, advance, and embed a sense of shared identity within the group of which 
both leaders and followers are part (Haslam et al., 2011; Platow, Haslam, Reicher, & 
Steffens, 2015; Steffens et al., 2014; van Dick & Kerschreiter, 2016).  
A key question here, then, is who group members turn to in order to discover the 
meaning of their identity. The obvious answer is to fellow ingroup members (i.e., insiders), 
and, more specifically, to those particular ingroup members who are prototypical of the group 
(i.e., those who embody shared group norms, values, goals and ideals; Hogg, 2001; Turner & 
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Haslam, 2001; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). By way of example, a member of 
‘Organization A’ (Joe) is more likely to select a leader from ‘Organization A’ (Anne, say) 
and be open to their influence than a leader from a competitor ‘Organization B’ (Barbara). 
Beyond this basic point related to shared group membership, people also vary in the degree to 
which they embody a group (with some being seen as a marginal and others as a core 
member of a given group) and this will affect how people respond to them. In particular, Joe 
will be more open to Anne’s leadership to the extent that Joe perceives her to embody what 
makes ‘Organization A’ special and distinct from ‘Organization B’. It is important to note 
that being group prototypical in this sense does not entail being an average group member, 
but rather it entails embodying ‘the best version of us’ (Haslam & Reicher, 2016; Steffens, 
Haslam, Kessler, & Ryan, 2013; van Knippenberg, 2011). 
Consistent with these claims, there is a large body of research which shows that 
leaders’ capacity to influence group members, and be perceived by them as having 
extraordinary capabilities (including charisma) rests on their capacity to be seen as 
prototypical of the group (e.g., Platow, van Knippenberg, Haslam, van Knippenberg, & 
Spears, 2006; for recent reviews see Barreto & Hogg, 2017; Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 
2012; Haslam et al., 2011; van Knippenberg, 2011). As Akerlof (2011, p. xvi) observes:  
People take stock in their group’ s leader; the leader’ s actions symbolize for them what 
they should or should not do. The leader is the archetypal “one of us.” In some cases 
leaders are so great that we cannot even aspire to be like them, but nevertheless their 
actions still indicate what we are supposed to do.  
Related to this, being representative is not just about being seen to be of the group, but 
also involves being seen to be acting for the group. In line with this proposition, there is 
abundant evidence that leaders’ capacity to engender followership is undermined to the 
extent that they are seen to be acting for themselves or for an outgroup (Haslam & Platow, 
2001). As suggested above, this analysis extends to perceptions of a leader’s charisma. While 
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charisma has traditionally been seen as a personal attribute that great leaders possess and 
which then helps to explain their greatness (i.e., an input; for a recent review, see Antonakis, 
Bastardoz, Jacquart, & Shamir, 2016; see also Bass & Riggio, 2006; House, Spangler, & 
Woycke, 1991), there is a growing body of evidence showing that it is an output of identity 
processes. For example, there is evidence that leaders are seen as more charismatic (a) if they 
are seen to be prototypical of the group they are leading (Platow et al., 2006), (b) if they are 
seen to prioritize the interests of ingroup members (Haslam et al., 2001) and (c) after their 
death (partly because this serves to heighten the sense that they are connected to the fate of 
the group; see Steffens, Peters, Haslam, & van Dick, 2017). 
Yet while this theory of identity leadership argues that leaders’ capacity to represent 
and advance the group in these two ways is critical, the theory also recognizes that the 
leadership process is not a passive one in which would-be leaders wait around until the 
mantle of prototypicality falls on their shoulders. Instead, as Reicher and colleagues have 
argued, leaders need to work actively to cultivate a sense of their own prototypicality 
(Augoustinos & de Garis, 2012; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; 2001; Reicher, Haslam, & 
Hopkins, 2005). Again there are two important aspects to this. First, leaders need to be 
identity entrepreneurs who work to define both themselves and the group they want to 
mobilize in ways that bring them into alignment. Accordingly, they need to create and invoke 
a sense of ‘us’, and, to the extent that they succeed in doing this, there is a greater likelihood 
that their own attempts at influence will too. A case in point is research examining the 
speeches of Australian Prime Ministerial candidates since 1901 (Steffens & Haslam, 2013; 
see also Reicher & Haslam, 2017; Weiss, Kolbe, Grote, Spahn, & Grande, 2017). This found 
that leaders who make more references to “we” and “us” in their official election campaign 
speeches go on to win 80% of elections (using these pronouns once every 79 words compared 
to their losing counterparts who used them every 136 words).  
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But it is not enough for leaders simply to talk about shared identity, they also need to 
be seen to enact it. More particularly, second, this means that they need to be impressarios of 
identity who work to create and choreograph a material world that makes notions of shared 
identity compelling and real, so that group members can live them out together. Indeed, in 
this respect, the power of such things as commemorations, conferences, festivals, rallies, and 
rituals is precisely to bring people together in ways that translate the idea of ‘us’ into lived 
experience. This is seen clearly, for example, in the work that Paul did to cement his position 
as a leader of the Christian church by devising and embedding a range of practices and 
activities (e.g., baptism) that united an array of hitherto disaggregated sects into a meaningful 
organized whole (Esler, 2003; Horrell, 2005).  
As Akerlof (2011) observes, the significance of this analysis of identity leadership is 
three-fold. First, it speaks to the importance of identity for organizational (and general social) 
behavior in a way that is entirely consistent with principles of identity economics. Second, it 
speaks to a gap in the economics literature associated with the fact that while there is 
recognition of the role that leaders play in shaping economic and organizational life (e.g., 
Jones & Olken, 2005), their capacity to do this by engendering followership has, historically, 
tended to be largely overlooked (Garretsen, Stoker, & Weber, 2017; Hermalin, 1998; 
Zehnder et al., 2017). Moreover, third, while suggesting that “the theory seems so very right 
that it may come as a surprise that this is not already the concept of leadership everywhere”, 
Akerlof (2011, p. xvi) notes that the theory of identity leadership “runs counter to the major 
trends in both economics and psychology [because] it expands motivation to take into 
account our identification as a we, and the associated notion of how we should behave”.  
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Applying Identity Economics and Identity Leadership to Understand Consequences of  
CEO Pay 
Yet despite the compatibility of identity economics and identity leadership literatures, 
to date there has been no attempt to align them empirically. In part, this reflects the fact not 
only that the methods of economics and psychology are quite different, but also that each 
discipline has somewhat different analytical priorities (Akerlof, 2011). However, one 
leadership topic in which both economists and psychologists — together with the public at 
large — have been perennially interested is that of CEO pay (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988; 
Garbers & Konradt, 2014; Gerhart & Fang, 2015; Hollander, 1995a, 1995b; Rynes et al., 
2005; Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2016; Tosi et al., 2004; Wall Street Journal, 
2014). Below we will outline historical trends in CEO pay before discussing two sets of 
predictions regarding its consequences. As we will see, here the predictions of traditional 
economic and psychological theories diverge appreciably from those of the identity models 
outlined above.  
Incomes of CEOs have risen dramatically in recent decades. Estimates of the increase 
in CEO salaries in major US corporations since the 1970s vary from 600 per cent between 
1980 and 2004 (Gabaix & Landier, 2008) to 1000 per cent between 1978 and 2014 (Mishel & 
Davis, 2015). Regardless of the exact estimate of this increase, this rate of growth contrasts 
with the near-stagnation of real wages for most workers. Mishel and Davis (2015) estimate a 
growth of 10.9 per cent in a typical worker’s annual compensation between 1978 and 2014, 
while other estimates indicate that real average wages US have fallen by 3.7% between 2000 
to 2014 (Desilver, 2014).  
This increase in CEO incomes also contrasts with decelerating productivity growth. 
When compared to the growth in the decades after the Second World War, the growth in 
productivity since the 1970s has been weak, with the slowdown being particularly marked in 
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the decade of the Great Recession beginning in 2007. At the same time, corporate profits 
have grown strongly (Sprague, 2017) and increasing CEO pay has occurred in parallel with 
an increase in corporate profitability and the market value of corporations. Gabaix and 
Landier (2008) estimate that the increase in CEO pay has been more or less proportional to 
the increase in corporate market value (even though a given CEO’s compensation does not 
necessarily correspond directly with the organization’s market value; Aguinis et al. 2017). 
Other estimates by Mishel and Davis (2015) indicate that CEO pay has risen almost twice as 
fast as the stock market, a view that is consistent with the suggestion of Bebchuk and Fried 
(2003) that CEO incomes have been shaped by managerial power and an absence of 
corporate governance. Indeed, speaking to the broader relevance of these issues, researchers 
have suggested that the high income of top managers, including CEOs, has been a driving 
force in the rising level of overall inequality that has been seen in many societies since the 
1980s (Piketty, 2014; Piketty & Saez, 2014). 
To understand what impact this growth in CEO pay may have had on their ability to 
effectively influence their workers (among other things, by affecting perceptions of their 
identity leadership and charisma), we turn first to traditional economics perspectives. These 
perspectives highlight the importance of incentive structures in ensuring that those who have 
responsibility for running organizations are sufficiently motivated to do their jobs well 
(Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2004). The logic here is also that because there is high demand 
for those (ostensibly few) people who have the ability to run an organization, high wages are 
needed both to lure them into CEO positions and to keep them there (Gabaix & Landier, 
2008; Pekala, 2001; for discussions see Perry, 2001; Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau, & Gerhart, 
2003). This approach also aligns with classical “great man” theories of leadership which see 
organizational and social progress as something that is achieved through the contributions of 
an elite cadre of superior individuals (Carlyle, 1840), and where, in the words of Heraclitus, 
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“The many are worthless, good men are few. One man is ten thousand if he is the best” 
(500bc; cited in Harter, 2008, p.69). From this perspective then, any organization that wishes 
to attract and motivate a highly capable CEO needs to offer highly competitive compensation 
package.  
Economic approaches focusing on shareholder value support similar expectations. A 
shareholder value model assumes that all organizational members (i.e., leaders and their 
subordinates) will prioritize their own personal interests at work; among other things, this 
means that they will seek to gain the best possible trade-off between monetary returns and 
effort. From this assumption, it follows that organizations need to implement incentives and 
sanctions to bring individual self-interest into alignment with organizational goals. This is 
achieved by incentivizing CEOs so that they are motivated to maximize profit for 
shareholders by extracting the greatest possible benefit from bargains with workers (who, in 
the terminology of Akerlof & Kranton, 2010, are ‘outsiders’). Here too, elevated CEO pay is 
perceived to be an important incentive that has the capacity to increase shareholder value.  
Similar expectations can be derived from work in the psychological and management 
literatures which argues that people use cues to make self-relevant inferences about 
leadership (Lord, Binning, Rush, & Thomas, 1978). From this perspective it can be argued 
that elevated CEO pay will have a positive impact on organizational outcomes because it 
serves as a signal of effective leadership, where this signal can be expected to have a positive 
impact on followers. There are at least two interrelated reasons for this. First, followers 
should be inclined to regard a leader as more attractive, more effective, and more charismatic 
to the extent that he or she receives higher pay (Rush, Thomas, & Lord, 1977; see also 
Binning & Lord, 1980; Lord et al., 1978; Moody, 2005). This may be the case because of a 
direct effect (due to followers’ knowledge of the leader’s pay) but also indirectly because 
leaders who receive high pay may display status symbols (e.g., by wearing expensive cloths, 
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living in expensive houses, driving expensive cars). Second, a leader’s high pay should have 
a positive motivational impact on followers in giving them a high goal to both identify with 
and aspire to (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Latham & Locke, 1991; Locke & Latham, 
2013). 
Against these various ideas, however, principles of identity economics and identity 
leadership suggest that the impact of CEO pay on organizational performance will in large 
part depend on its impact on organizational members’ sense of identification with both the 
leader and the organization. Core to these perspectives is the idea that, other things being 
equal, workers who identify with the leader are also more likely to identify with the 
organization, and therefore act in the interests of the organization as a whole (Sluss, Ployhart, 
Cobb, & Ashforth, 2012; van Dick, Hirst, Grojean, & Wieseke, 2007; Wieseke, Ahearne, 
Lam, & Dick, 2009). However, the idea that high pay is needed to attract and motivate the 
best CEOs is antithetical to these identity leadership processes. In particular, this is because if 
the CEO is seen to act as a self-interested ‘outsider’ by demanding the highest possible pay, 
then this should undermine followers’ sense that they are representative, and acting in the 
interests, of a bigger “we”. Indeed, because huge wage disparities have the capacity to 
undermine a sense of shared identity between leaders and followers, the identity approach 
suggests that their impact will generally be negative — not least because the identity 
divisions that large wage differentials open up may create a sense of illegitimacy and 
unfairness (Blader & Tyler, 2009; Hollander, 1995a, 1995b; Tyler & Blader, 2000; 2003). 
Such suggestions align with Drucker’s (1992) recollection of J. P. Morgan’s observation that 
the defining feature of his poorly performing clients was a tendency to overpay those at the 
top of the company: 
Very high salaries at the top, concluded Morgan — who was hardly contemptuous of big 
money or an ‘anticapitalist’ — disrupt the team.  They make even high-ranking people in 
the company see their own top management as adversaries rather than as colleagues. ...  
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And that quenches any willingness to say ‘we’ and to exert oneself except in one’s own 
immediate self-interest.  (p. 14, cited in Haslam, 2001, p.90; for related evidence from 
academic and sporting domains, see Bloom, 1999; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993).         
Principles of identity leadership thus suggest that, by compromising a sense of shared 
social identity between CEOs and employees, high wage disparities are likely to create “us–
versus–them” distinctions whereby employees perceive CEOs as members of a different 
group (‘them’) in ways that reduce those putative followers’ personal identification with 
them (as shown by Steffens, Haslam, & Reicher, 2014). To the extent that this is the case, 
this in turn would be predicted to undermine those employees’ sense that CEOs are (a) good 
identity leaders (i.e., who are creating, representing, advancing and embedding ‘us’; Steffens 
et al., 2014) and (b) charismatic. This latter prediction is important because a growing body 
of research shows that perceptions of charisma are a key component of leaders’ (including 
CEOs’) effectiveness (Antonakis et al., 2016; Bass, 1985; Judge & Piccolo, 2004) and are 
predictive of a range of important group and organizational outcomes (Geyery, & Steyrer, 
1998; Waldman, Ramirez, House, & Puranam, 2001; for a meta-analytic review, see Wang et 
al., 2011). Significantly, though, as we have noted, the identity approach leads us to see 
charisma not simply as a psychological commodity that leaders bring with them to social and 
organizational settings but also as an outcome of identity processes such that leaders are 
generally seen as more charismatic — and more able to motivate and inspire followers as a 
result — to the extent that they are seen as embodying the shared identity of the group that 
they lead (Platow et al., 2006; Steffens et al., 2014; see also van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 
2013). 
The Present Research 
The foregoing review makes it clear that when it comes to understanding the 
consequences of a high discrepancy between the compensation received by a CEO and that 
received by other members of their organization, the predictions that flow from principles of 
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identity economics and identity leadership are very different from those of standard economic 
and psychological models. More specifically, where high CEO pay has tended to be justified 
by claims that it will incentivize leaders to inspire their followers and hold them to account, 
thereby driving organizational performance, identity models lead us to hypothesize that it has 
the capacity to (a) reduce followers’ identification with those leaders (H1) and thereby reduce 
those followers’ sense that CEOs are both (b) good (identity) leaders (who are representing 
and advancing the interests of the group; H2), and (c) charismatic (H3).  
To test these three hypotheses we conducted two studies to examine the nature of the 
relationship between leader (CEO) pay and people’s personal identification with leaders. The 
studies also examined whether, by affecting followers’ personal identification with a leader, 
CEO pay has a bearing on perceptions of that CEO’s (a) identity leadership and (b) charisma. 
Study 1 provided an experimental test of our hypotheses that involved manipulating a (male) 
CEO’s pay and then assessing individuals’ identification with that leader and their 
perceptions of his identity leadership and charisma. To provide insight into the 
generalizability of the findings of this first study, we then conducted a second field study in 
which we assessed identical constructs in a survey where a sample of respondents from the 
general public provided ratings of the CEO of their own organization.  
In both studies we assessed and controlled for respondents’ social dominance 
orientation (SDO; i.e., their preference for group hierarchy; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & 
Malle, 1994) and meritocracy beliefs (i.e., their belief that resource distributions are based on 
merit; Son Hing et al., 2011). These are two important variables in this context because social 
dominance orientation captures individuals’ beliefs that there are some groups in society that 
are legitimately superior to others, which might influence individuals’ responses to leaders as 
a function of whether those leaders receive low or (superior) high pay. Meritocracy beliefs is 
a second key variable in this context because people often justify high pay by referring to 
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notions that those who receive significant resources (such as pay) deserve this on the basis of 
their contribution (e.g., Frank, 2016). We included these variables as control variables with 
the aim of conducting sensitivity analysis to examine the extent to which hypothesized 
relationships are influenced by, and hold above and beyond, individual differences in these 
two factors. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design. Six-hundred-and-twenty-seven US residents participated in 
the present study after being recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (for discussions of 
strengths and limitations of this platform, see Harms & DeSimone, 2015; Landers & 
Behrend, 2015). Thirty-seven participants who failed to respond to three control questions as 
requested (“This is a control question—please select ‘1’/ ‘2’ / ‘strongly disagree’”) were 
excluded, leaving a total of 590 participants in the final sample (Mage=35.35 years; 
SD=10.56; 46% female). Participants were reimbursed $US1.50 upon completion of the 
study. They were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions (leader pay: low 
vs. high). The study received ethical clearance from the Behavioral and Social Sciences 
Ethics Research Committee at the first author’s institution. 
Procedure and measures. Participants were invited to participate in a study entitled 
“People’s perceptions of the CEOs of various American companies”. Having done so, they 
read a one-page biography about Ruben Martin who was introduced as the CEO of the US 
technology company Diebold. They then read one of two summary biographies of Rubin 
Martin as presented in Figure 1. These provided identical details of Martin’s experiences, 
accolades, company successes, and technological innovations but differed (only) in his 
reported level of compensation. In the low leader pay condition, the summary was entitled 
“Ruben Martin: Big on Technological Advance, Small on Salary”. Additionally, the summary 
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concluded by observing that “Ruben Martin is moderately paid for his role, being paid less 
than 97% of American CEOs”.  In the high leader pay condition, the summary was entitled 
“Ruben Martin: Big on Technological Advance, Big on Salary” and concluded by noting that 
“Ruben Martin is highly paid for his role, being paid more than 97% of American CEOs”. It 
is possible that people’s responses would also be impacted by the comparison between pay of 
the CEO relative to the pay of employees. In the present research, we focused on CEO pay 
relative to other CEOs for two key reasons. First, CEOs often justify their own levels of pay 
by comparing their work, responsibilities, and pay not with those of other employees but with 
those of other CEOs (The Guardian, 2018). Second, CEOs tend to be the most highly paid 
individuals in an organization and so in most cases, even though one might argue that varying 
degrees of higher pay compared to employees would be consequential, comparisons with 
employees as a whole will almost always be highly favorable for CEOs. The benefit of 
focusing on CEO pay relative to the pay of other CEOs (vs. other employees) thus derives 
from the fact that there greater variance in this variable. This is an issue we return to in the 
General Discussion. 
After they had read the biography, participants in both conditions responded to the 
same dependent and control measures, and also provided demographic data before being 
debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
Personal identification with Leader. Participants responded to the 4-item personal 
identification measure from Steffens, Haslam, and Reicher (2014; after Doosje, Ellemers, & 
Spears, 1995) (α=.89; “I identify with [this leader]”; “I feel strong ties with [this leader]”; “I 
am pleased with [this leader]”; I feel committed to [this leader]”). On these and all other 
scales, unless indicated otherwise, participants rated their level of agreement on scales with 
anchors ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely). 
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Identity leadership. Participants responded to the four items of Steffens et al.’s (2014) 
Identity Leadership Inventory-Short Form to assess the extent to which the leader was seen to 
cultivate a collective identity in his organization (Diebold) (α=.91; “[This leader] is a model 
member of [the organization]”; “[This leader] acts as a champion for [the organization]”; 
“[This leader] creates a sense of cohesion within [the organization]”; “[This leader] creates 
structures that are useful for members of [the organization]”).  
 Leader charisma. Participants responded to an adapted version of the 8-item 
Attribution of Leader Charisma (ALC) scale developed by Platow and colleagues (2006). 
This scale is based on the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (Bass & Avolio, 2004; but in 
contrast to the MLQ it is freely available for research purposes) and maps onto Bass and 
Riggio’s (2006) conceptualization of charisma as consisting of the idealized influence and 
inspirational motivation dimensions of transformational leadership. In line with suggestions 
by Antonakis and colleagues (2016) and following the empirical operationalization by 
Steffens et al. (2017), we used only the three items of the scale that map onto the refined 
conceptualization of charisma (see Antonakis et al., 2016: Table 1; α=.85; “[This leader] has 
a compelling vision for the future”; “[This leader] is an inspiring person”; “[This leader] has 
a sense of mission”).1 
Social dominance orientation. We used the 16-item Social Dominance Orientation 
(SDO) scale from Pratto et al. (1994) to assess individuals’ preference for social hierarchy 
and their acceptance of the dominance of high-status over low-status groups (α=.96; e.g., “In 
getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups”; “Some 
groups are simply inferior to others”). Scale anchors ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). 
Meritocracy beliefs. Participants responded to the 15-item Perceptions that 
Meritocracy Exists (PME) scale by Son Hing and colleagues (2011). This measured the 
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extent to which they believed that outcome allocations are based on merit (α=.65; e.g., “In 
organizations, people who do their job well rise to the top”; “In life, people get what they 
deserve”) on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Manipulation check. To determine whether participants’ perceptions were consistent 
with the experimental manipulation, they responded to the item “Martin is one of the top-paid 
CEOs in the US” on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Results 
Manipulation check. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between measures 
are presented in Table 1. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that participants’ 
perceptions of leader pay varied as a function of experimental condition, F(1,589)=2606.71, 
p<.001, MD=5.08, 95%CIs [4.89, 5.28], Cohen’s d=4.18. As expected, participants believed 
that the high-paid CEO was a top-paid CEO in the US (M=6.78, 95%CIs [6.70, 6.86]) more 
than they believed that this was true of the low-paid CEO (M=1.70, 95%CIs [1.52, 1.88]). 
This indicates that our manipulation of leader pay was successful.  
Personal identification with leader. ANOVA indicated that individuals’ personal 
identification with the leader varied significantly as a function of experimental condition, 
MD=.49, 95%CIs [.27, .70], d=.36. Consistent with H1, respondents identified less strongly 
with the high-paid CEO (M=3.83, 95%CIs [3.67, 3.99]) than with the low-paid CEO 
(M=4.31, 95%CIs [4.17, 4.46]). 
Indirect effects on identity leadership and charisma. To test the indirect effects of 
pay on identity leadership and leader charisma through personal identification with leaders, 
we ran bias-corrected bootstrapping with 5000 resamples using PROCESS (Model 4; Hayes, 
2013). Supporting H2, this revealed a significant negative indirect path from leader pay to 
leader’s identity leadership through reduced personal identification with the leader, γ=–.10, 
SE=.03, 95%CIs [–.16, –.06], R2Model = .35 (coefficients for individual paths in model: from 
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pay to personal identification with leader: a = –.48, SE = .11, 95%CIs [–.70, –.27], from 
personal identification with leader to identity leadership controlling for pay: b = .22, SE = 
.02, 95%CIs [.17, .26], from pay to identity leadership, c = –.18, SE = .07, 95%CIs [–.32, –
.04], from leader pay to identity leadership while controlling for personal identification, c’ = 
–.07, SE = .07, 95%CIs [–.21, .06]). In other words, as shown in Figure 2, higher leader pay 
le to respondents being less identified with the leader, which in turn was associated with 
reduced perceptions of his identity leadership. 
Providing support for H3, bootstrapping analysis also indicated that there was a 
significant indirect path from leader pay to leader charisma through reduced perceivers’ 
personal identification with the leader, γ=–.14, SE=.04, 95%CIs [–.22, –.08], R2Model = .47 
(coefficients for individual paths in model: from pay to personal identification with leader: a 
= –.48, SE = .11, 95%CIs [–.70, –.27], from personal identification with leader to charisma 
controlling for pay: b = .30, SE = .02, 95%CIs [.26, .35], from pay to charisma, c = –.21, SE 
= .07, 95%CIs [–.35, –.07], from leader pay to charisma while controlling for personal 
identification, c’ = –.07, SE = .07, 95%CIs [–.19, .06]). Again, this indicated that leader pay 
reduced personal identification with the leader which in turn was related to diminished 
perceptions of the leader’s charisma. 
Sensitivity analyses. We ran several additional sensitivity analyses in order to 
examine the robustness of the above relationships. First, we conducted a series of hierarchical 
linear regression analyses that controlled for individuals’ SDO and beliefs in meritocracy. In 
these, we entered the experimental condition (low-paid vs. high-paid leader dummy coded as 
0 and 1) in Step 1 and the (Z-standardized) SDO and beliefs in meritocracy in Step 2. The 
results are presented in Table 2 and these indicated that experimental condition remained a 
significant predictor of personal identification with the leader even after controlling for SDO 
and meritocracy beliefs, b=–.48, 95%CIs [–.69, –.27], β=–.18, t(585)=4.48, p<.001. 
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Second, we examined whether the effect of pay was moderated by SDO and/or 
meritocracy beliefs. Here regression analyses examining moderation by SDO revealed a 
significant effect of experimental condition on individuals’ identification with the leader, β=–
.18, t(587)=4.47, p<.001, and a significant effect of SDO at Step 1, β=.15, t(587)=3.63, 
p<.001. Adding the interaction term at Step 2 yielded a non-significant interaction term 
between the two variables, β=.06, t(586)=.96, p=.336. Furthermore, analysis examining 
moderation by meritocracy beliefs revealed a significant effect of condition on individuals’ 
identification with the leader, β=–.18, t(586)=4.43, p<.001, and a significant effect of 
meritocracy beliefs at Step 1, β=.18, t(586)=4.61, p<.001. Adding the interaction term at Step 
2 indicated a non-significant interaction effect, β=.12, t(585)=1.94, p=.053. These sensitivity 
analyses indicate that leader pay had an impact on perceivers’ responses above and beyond 
perceivers’ ideological beliefs, while providing no evidence that those beliefs moderated the 
effect of leader pay. 
Finally, we conducted additional indirect-effects analyses controlling for SDO and 
meritocracy beliefs. Analysis yielded a very similar pattern of results with indirect paths 
through individuals’ reduced personal identification with the leader on both identity 
leadership, γ=–.10, SE=.03, 95%CIs [–.16, –.06], R2Model = .38, and leader charisma, γ=–.15, 
SE=.03, 95%CIs [–.22, –.08], R2Model = .50. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 provide causal evidence that, in line with principles of identity 
economics (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005, 2010) and identity leadership (Haslam et al., 2011; 
Steffens et al., 2014), individuals identify less with a high-paid CEO than with one who is 
low paid (H1). Furthermore, results revealed indirect effects of CEO pay through personal 
identification with that leader to perceptions of their identity leadership and charisma. More 
specifically, findings indicated that individuals identify less strongly with a high-paid CEO 
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and that this in turn was associated with perceptions that the CEO was (a) less capable of 
cultivating a collective identity (supporting H2) and (b) less charismatic (supporting H3). 
Finally, sensitivity analysis indicated that these relationships are not simply a reflection of 
individual differences in ideology in so far as the above patterns hold when also controlling 
for individuals’ social dominance orientation and beliefs in meritocracy. 
The key strength of this first study was that the use of experimental methodology 
allows us to make causal inferences about the role that CEOs’ pay plays in shaping followers’ 
identification with those CEOs and is thereby associated with perceptions of their leadership 
and charisma. Nevertheless, the study was limited by the artificiality of the leadership 
scenario and, in particular, by the fact that it did not examine responses to real leaders with 
whom participants had a real relationship (e.g., because they worked for the same 
organization). To address this issue and examine the generalizability of the present results, 
we therefore conducted a field study in which employees responded to the most senior leader 
of their own organization. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 502 participants who resided in the US via a 
professional research participation organization, Prolific (Prolific, 2016; Peer, Brandimarte, 
Samat, & Acquisti, 2017) to complete an on-line survey. To be eligible for the study 
respondents had to work full- or part-time in a company that had a Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO, or equivalent) as the most senior executive in their company. Fifty-two participants 
who failed to respond to three control questions as requested (“This is a control question — 
please select ‘1’ / ‘7’/ ‘strongly disagree’ ”) were removed, resulting in a final sample of 444 
participants who entered the analyses (Mage=30.47; SD=9.63; 194 female; 249 male; 1 
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undisclosed). Three-hundred-and-twelve participants worked full-time and 117 worked part-
time (15 undisclosed).  
Procedure and measures. Participants were invited to participate in a survey about 
“People’s Perceptions of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) / Managing Director of their 
Company”. At the start of the survey, they provided data about their CEO, including their 
gender (male=357, female=87) and tenure as CEO (M=10.07 years; SD=9.38; 6 undisclosed). 
They then responded to measures that were exactly the same as those included in Study 1. In 
particular, they first responded (a) to an item assessing CEO pay that was identical to the 
manipulation check in Study 1 (“This CEO is one of the top-paid CEOs in the US”) and then 
responded to measures assessing (b) their personal identification with their CEO (α=.94; 4 
items), (c) the CEO’s identity leadership (α=.94; 4 items), and (d) the CEO’s charisma 
(α=.88; 3 items). As in Study 1, we also assessed SDO (α=.95; 16 items) and meritocracy 
beliefs (α=.60; 15 items) and requested participants’ demographic data before debriefing 
them about the purpose of the research.  
We also included two new measures. The first asked participants to specify their 
CEO’s comparative pay using an adjustable slider that was anchored with “my CEO receives 
more pay than 0% of other CEOs” and “my CEO receives more pay than 100% of other 
CEOs”). The second asked participants to provide their best estimate of the number of people 
who worked in their company in order to control for a relationship between CEO pay and the 
size of the organization (Gabaix & Landier, 2008). The study received ethical clearance from 
the Behavioral and Social Sciences Ethics Research Committee of the first author’s 
institution. 
Results 
Effects on personal identification with leader. Table 3 presents means, standard 
deviations, and correlations between measures. To test H1, we ran linear regression analysis 
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with CEO comparative pay predicting personal identification with their leader. For ease of 
interpretability (and to allow for consistency with the sensitivity analyses that examines 
interactions), predictor variables (CEO pay, SDO, and meritocracy beliefs) were Z-
standardized in all subsequent analyses. Results from all regression (including sensitivity) 
analyses with details of inferential statistics and effect sizes are presented in Table 4.  
Results of the main linear regression analysis supported H1 in revealing a negative 
relationship between comparative CEO (leader) pay and individuals’ personal identification 
with that leader, b=–.32, 95%CIs [–.46,–.16], β=–.19, t(442)=4.01, p<.001. Thus, to the 
extent that people regarded their CEO to be highly paid relative to other CEOs, they 
identified less strongly with him or her. In terms of effect size strength, comparison with 
benchmarks in the HRM and OB literatures indicates that this effect is larger than about 70% 
of the effect sizes reported in the HR and OB literatures and larger than about 50% of the 
effect sizes in the leadership literature (Paterson, Harms, Steel, & Credé, 2016). 
Indirect effects on identity leadership and charisma. As in Study 1, we examined 
indirect effects from comparative CEO (leader) pay via personal identification with leaders to 
perceived identity leadership and leader charisma by means of bias-corrected bootstrapping 
with 5000 resamples using PROCESS (Model 4; Hayes, 2013). Providing support for H2 and 
H3, results revealed a significant indirect negative path from comparative CEO pay through 
individuals’ reduced identification with that CEO to both (a) perceived identity leadership, 
γ=–.11, SE=.03, 95%CIs [–.17,–.05], R2Model = .64 (coefficients for individual paths in model: 
from pay to personal identification with leader: a = –.20, SE = .05, 95%CIs [–.30, –.20], from 
personal identification with leader to identity leadership controlling for pay: b = .55, SE = 
.03, 95%CIs [–.04, .10], from pay to identity leadership, c = –.08, SE = .04, 95%CIs [–.17, 
.00], from leader pay to identity leadership while controlling for personal identification, c’ = 
–.03, SE = .03, 95%CIs [–.04, .10]) and (b) perceived leader charisma, γ=–.11, SE=.03, 
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95%CIs [–.17,–.05], R2Model = .67 (coefficients for individual paths in model: from pay to 
personal identification with leader: a = –.20, SE = .05, 95%CIs [–.30, –.10], from personal 
identification with leader to charisma controlling for pay: b = .55, SE = .03, 95%CIs [.49, 
.35], from pay to charisma, c = .00, SE = .04, 95%CIs [–.08, .09], from leader pay to 
charisma while controlling for personal identification, c’ = .12, SE = .03, 95%CIs [.05, .18]).2 
These results are presented in Figure 3. 
Sensitivity analyses. We conducted several additional sensitivity analyses. First, as in 
Study 1, we examined the extent to which the above results hold when controlling for 
individual differences in SDO and meritocracy beliefs. As can be seen from Table 4, 
sensitivity analyses controlling for these variables yielded a virtually identical pattern of 
results to that reported above. Specifically, results show that (a) elevated CEO pay is 
associated with reduced personal identification with the leader even after controlling for the 
impact of SDO and meritocracy beliefs, while (b) providing no evidence that the pay–
identification link is moderated by SDO or meritocracy beliefs. Furthermore, additional 
indirect effects analyses controlling for SDO and meritocracy beliefs yielded largely identical 
results and significant indirect paths through followers’ personal identification with their 
leader to identity leadership, γ=–.11, SE=.03, 95%CIs [–.17,–.06], R2Model = .46, and leader 
charisma, γ=–.12, SE=.03, 95%CIs [–.17,–.06], R2Model = .47. 
Second, we examined whether the relationship between CEO (leader) pay and 
personal identification with that leader is curvilinear in order to examine whether there are 
diminishing returns associated with increasing comparative pay. This involved computing the 
quadratic term of CEO pay and adding it to the (Z-standardized) linear term of CEO pay as a 
predictor of outcomes. Analysis revealed that the quadratic term was unrelated to individuals’ 
personal identification with their leader, b=.01, 95%CIs [–.14, .14], β=.01, and did not 
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account for additional variance beyond that accounted for by the linear term, ΔR2<.001, 
p=.959. There was thus no evidence that the focal relationship takes a non-linear form. 
Third, we repeated the main analysis using the alternative measure of leader pay 
(ranging from more than 0 to 100% of other CEOs). Results for this second measure revealed 
substantively identical results to those revealed by the primary measure, b=–.009, 95%CIs [–
.015,–.002], β=–.13, t(442)=2.68, p=.008. In other words, the more CEOs were paid relative 
to their peers, the less workers identified with them.  
 In our final analysis, we examined whether the above relationships could be 
accounted for by variations in the size of participants’ organizations. Although we found that 
organizational size was negatively associated with workers’ identification with their CEO, r = 
–.12, p = .011 and positively associated with perceived CEO pay, r = .31, p < .001, including 
it as an additional control in the above linear regression did not eliminate the focal effect. 
That is, comparative CEO pay had an independent negative association with workers’ 
personal identification with the CEO, b=–.180, 95%CIs [–.286,–.074], β=–.17, t(442)=3.35, 
p=.001; while at the same time the size of the organization was not a significant predictor of 
workers’ personal identification, β=–.07, t(442)=1.41, p=.159. 
Discussion 
Findings from this study replicated those of Study 1 and again supported the 
predictions of identity economics (Akerlof & Kranton, 2005, 2010) and identity leadership 
(Haslam et al., 2011; Steffens et al., 2014) in showing that elevated CEO pay is associated 
with reduced personal identification with that leader on the part of employees in that CEO’s 
organization (H1). Furthermore, results show that individuals’ lower identification with a 
high-paid leader is in turn associated with a diminished sense that the leader (a) is displaying 
identity leadership (H2) and (b) is charismatic (H3). Moreover, as in Study 1, findings 
indicate that the link between elevated leader pay and reduced identification with the leader 
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holds even when controlling for individual differences in ideology (specifically, social 
dominance orientation and beliefs in meritocracy). Additional analyses also provided no 
evidence that the relationship between a leader’s pay and personal identification with that 
leader was curvilinear. It is important to note too that hypothesized relationships also held 
when using an alternative descriptive measure of comparative CEO pay, and when 
controlling for organizational size. 
These results are consistent with those found in Study 1. However, it is important to 
note that because this study employed a cross-sectional design, its findings do not provide 
evidence of causality and cannot rule out alternative explanations. Among other things, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that it is employees’ low levels of identification with their 
leaders that increases CEO pay (rather than the reverse). For instance, decision-makers in 
organizations whose employees do not identify with leaders may actually pay CEOs higher 
wages in recognition of the associated leadership challenges. Alternatively, employees who 
do not identify with their leaders may (incorrectly) perceive that these leaders are paid high 
salaries. This means that these results must be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that follow-up analyses did not provide any evidence for other alternative 
explanations (i.e., that the relationship between a leader’s pay and personal identification 
with that leader was curvilinear) and that we also found that hypothesized relationships held 
when using an alternative descriptive measure of comparative CEO pay, and when 
controlling for organizational size. 
General Discussion 
In the U.S. in 2016 the median annual income of a CEO of one of the largest 500 
companies was $10.3 million — nearly 250 times greater than the average wage of $44,148 
per annum (Brandeisky, 2016); in Britain in the same year the average take-home pay for 
CEOs was £4.5m, around 160 times the average annual wage of £28,200 (High Pay Centre, 
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2017). The scale of these disparities ensures that the issue of CEO pay and its implications 
for organizational performance is both highly topical and highly contentious (e.g., see 
Garbers & Konradt, 2014; Gerhart & Fang, 2015; Stanford Graduate School of Business, 
2016). The aim of the present paper was to shed light on this controversy with a view to 
achieving two important goals. One of these was to provide the first empirical analysis 
integrating themes from recent work informed by theories of identity economics (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2005, 2010) and identity leadership (Haslam et al., 2011; Steffens et al., 2014). 
Although these theories have a common intellectual heritage, it is apparent that they have not 
previously been used to shed light on the same set of issues. In this respect the significance of 
the present treatment is that it bears testimony not only to the ways in which this alignment 
can be achieved but also to its capacity to prove analytically fruitful (in ways suggested by 
Akerlof, 2011; Zehnder et al., 2017). A second goal was to compare predictions advanced by 
traditional economic and psychological models which focus on the incentivizing impact of 
high leader pay, with those of identity models which focus on its impact for organizational 
members’ sense of shared group membership.  
Consistent with principles of identity economics and identity leadership, the results 
from two studies show that a CEO’s elevated pay is associated with individuals’ reduced 
personal identification with that leader. More specifically, findings from an experiment 
(Study 1) provide causal evidence that high (vs. low) CEO pay reduces the extent to which 
people identify with a CEO (supporting H1). Furthermore, this study revealed indirect effects 
whereby the lower personal identification with the leader that results from high pay is 
associated with perceivers’ sense that the leader (a) does not cultivate a collective identity (a 
sense of “we”) within the organization (supporting H2) and (b) is not charismatic (supporting 
H3). Study 2 replicated these findings in a field survey that examined people’s responses to 
the CEO of their own organization. Results from both studies also indicated that elevated 
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CEO pay reduces individuals’ identification with a CEO above and beyond individual 
differences in ideology (i.e., social dominance orientation and beliefs in meritocracy). 
Findings from Study 2 further indicate that the relationship between leader pay and 
individuals’ personal identification with the leader was linear, with no evidence of a 
curvilinear relationship. 
As well as showing that wage disparities have important consequences as a function 
of their implications for perceptions of shared identity, the present findings also challenge 
economic and psychological assumptions that are often invoked to justify high CEO pay (for 
relevant discussions see Aguinies et al., 2017; Perry, 2001; Rynes et al., 2004; Sturman et al, 
2003). In particular, our results show that while pay may be intended to motivate and reward 
good performance on the part of leaders and to encourage followers to view them positively 
and be motivated to emulate them, there is little evidence of the latter effects in our studies. 
Indeed, on the contrary, the impact of high CEO pay on followers is rather to diminish their 
sense of connection to that leader (in ways suggested by Drucker, 1986; Haslam, 2001; 
Hollander 1995a), and, as a result, to diminish their sense either that they are good leaders for 
‘us’ or that they are charismatic. These latter effects are significant as there is an abundance 
of evidence which speaks to the fact that perceived identity leadership and charisma are 
powerful predictors of a range of organizational outcomes (e.g., Antonakis, et al., 2016; Bass, 
1985; Geyery, & Steyrer, 1998; Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Puranam, 2001; Steffens et al., 2014; 
van Dick et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2011). 
Further Implications   
Aside from their implications for our hypotheses, the present results also have at least 
three further important implications. The most obvious of these is that high CEO pay has the 
capacity to undermine followership and thereby compromise organizational performance. 
Until recently, the dominant view of CEO pay has been that of ‘pay for performance’ (i.e., 
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the idea CEOs should be rewarded on the basis of the value they generate for shareholders). It 
is noteworthy, though, that Jensen and Murphy (1990) observed that CEO pay was only 
weakly related to the market value of corporations and imputed this weak relationship to 
political constraints. During the 1990s, and subsequently, political constraints on CEO pay 
disappeared, and payments to CEOs increased greatly. The lack of any corresponding 
improvement in economic performance led critics such as Bebchuk and Fried (2003) to argue 
that the present pay arrangements reflect a managerial ‘rent-seeking’ model of ‘pay without 
performance’. Theoretical explanations for drawbacks of pay-for-performance models focus 
on agency problems. For instance, Holmström and Milgrom (1991, 1994) pointed to 
problems that could arise when payment is tied to one, easily measurable aspect of 
performance, while other, less observable tasks are neglected. Similarly, CEO are rewarded 
on the basis of quarterly profits might neglect long-term investment (arguments that fed into 
an ongoing debate over the problem of short-term bias in decision making; Bolton, 
Scheinkman, & Xiong, W, 2006; Laverty, 1996; Narayanan, 1985; Quiggin 1995). The 
present findings provide an additional explanation of externalities of the application of pay-
for-performance ideas to CEO pay such that elevated CEO pay can create distance between 
CEOs and followers that is a barrier for CEOs’ leadership. 
At the same time, though, it is also apparent that it need not have this impact — not 
least because organizations (and their CEOs) may go to a lot of trouble to restrict access to 
information about executive salaries (Bebchuk, & Fried, 2003) and to make it very hard to 
decode the total compensation package that CEOs receive (Pozen & Khotari, 2017). Indeed, 
the fact that estimates of median annual CEO salary in the largest U.S. companies typically 
underestimate this by a factor of 10 (so that the modal estimate is $1m p.a. when it is actually 
$10.3m; Brandeisky, 2016) suggests that this strategy is quite successful. Moreover, the 
present research shows that there may be good reasons for this secrecy (Belogolovsky, & 
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Bamberger, 2014) because to the extent that people are not aware that leaders receive 
exorbitant pay, then the capacity for this to disrupt organizational functioning is minimized. 
Indeed, it seems plausible that organizations may be motivated to keep information about 
executive salaries to themselves precisely because they have an implicit understanding of the 
patterns revealed by the present research. 
A second major implication of this research is for the literature on charisma. Research 
has typically conceptualized charisma (of leaders, CEOs) as a personal quality (and 
commodity) that leaders bring into organizational environments (Antonakis, Fenley, & 
Liechti, 2011; Den Hartog & Verburg, 1997; House et al., 1991; House & Howell, 1992; 
Keller, 2006) and which then goes on to drive enhanced organizational performance (Tosi et 
al., 2004; Waldman et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2011). At the same time, though, the literature 
on the social construction of charisma demonstrates that perceptions of leader charisma are 
inferred on the basis of a range of contextual factors — in particular, (a) improved group or 
organizational performance (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985), (b) belief that leaders are 
responsible for positive organizational outcomes (Schyns, Felfe, & Blank, 2007), (c) leaders’ 
embodiment of a group identity (Platow et al., 2006), and (d) leaders’ death (Steffens et al., 
2017). The present results extend this line of research by showing that people also attribute 
charisma to leaders on the basis of the remuneration that those leaders receive — so that they 
are seen as more charismatic the less they personally benefit from group performance. As 
with our main findings, this makes sense from the perspective of identity leadership theory 
because it suggests that leaders are valued and valorized to the extent that they are seen to be 
‘in it for us’ rather than ‘in it for themselves’ (Haslam et al., 2011).   
Third, the present results have broader implications for workers’ loyalty to employers. 
Aggregate evidence particularly from the U.S. suggests that the identity model of leadership 
is being displaced by one in which the interests of managers are aligned with those of 
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shareholders while relationships between managers and employees are essentially 
transactional, with each side seeking to gain as much, and give as little, as possible. As 
discussed above, the pay of CEOs has risen broadly in line with (though perhaps more 
rapidly than) the market valuation of corporations, while wages have barely moved. In line 
with such an transactional perspective, loyalty to an organization is not rewarded. Masakure 
(2016) finds that workers in the UK who express high levels with loyalty to their employers 
(assessed by agreement with statements such as ‘I share many of the values of my 
organization’; ‘I feel loyal to my organization’ and ‘I am proud to tell people who I work 
for’) earn lower wages, on average, than workers with similar characteristics who have lower 
loyalty. These findings also align with findings from the US suggesting that firms do not in 
general reward loyalty (Cohen, 2008; see also Judge et al., 2012). The large observed 
increases in CEO pay are consistent with the abandonment of an ‘identity leadership’ role in 
favor of one where the primary role of the CEO is to act as an agent for shareholders, 
extracting as much as possible of the surplus generated by the organization. Although this 
approach may be profitable over the relatively short time horizons relevant to shareholders 
and senior managers, the present results show that this reduces the bond of workers to their 
leaders and organizations, which in turn is likely to have significant consequences for the 
long-term viability of organizations. 
Limitations and Future Research 
For all their strengths, as with any research, the present studies also have a number of 
limitations. First, the results show that the focal relationship that we have studied is quite 
robust in so far as it holds across experimental and field studies and above and beyond social 
dominance and meritocracy beliefs. Nevertheless, there would be value in examining the 
extent to which this relationship is influenced by other potential (moderating) factors 
including characteristics of the leader (e.g., their perceived competence or group 
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prototypicality) and characteristics of respondents such as their own level of pay, their beliefs 
about pay differential between CEO and employees, their own position in the organizational 
hierarchy, and their ideology and culture (Ensari & Murphy, 2003; Pillai & Meindl, 1998). 
Similarly, there would be value in examining to that extent to which the effect is moderated 
by the transparency of an organization’s approach to executive pay as well as salience of 
leader pay (Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014). It is possible, for instance, that the strength 
of the effects we have observed are diminished to the extent that organizations adopt an open 
and transparent approach to leader pay in ways that communicate, and build, a sense of 
shared identity and trust with organizational members (Helliwell & Huang, 2011; Peters, 
Morton, & Haslam, 2010). We would highlight that in Study 2 participants first responded to 
leader pay before completing dependent variables (which may have increased the salience of 
pay) and the strength of the relationship may be weaker when participants respond to these 
questions in the reverse order. Indeed, with this in mind, it certainly would worthwhile 
examining the relationship between leader pay and people’s responses to pay as a function of 
varying levels of the salience of leader pay (as well as the different practices that 
organizations adopt to manage its salience). Other potentially interesting factors might be (a) 
the type of industry (and the prevailing norms within it) as well as (b) the nature of 
employment and organizational structures (not least because, in times of increasing short-
term employment, employees may be less able to connect to, and develop identification with, 
leaders in their organization). 
Second, the present research examines a limited number of dependent variables. 
Clearly, in future work it would be valuable to extend the suite of dependent variables to test 
identity and alternative standard models more fully by providing a more comprehensive 
picture of the range of consequences associated with high leader pay. At the same time, there 
is reason to believe that effects observed on other indicators of organizational effectiveness 
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are likely to be parallel to the ones we observe here not least because evidence indicates that 
identity leadership (van Dick et al., 2018) and charisma (Banks et al., 2017) are positively 
associated with employee motivation and performance. Nevertheless, it would be interesting 
to examine how leader pay affects company performance by shaping not only followers’ 
motivation and willingness to make an effort for the leader but also leaders’ own motivation 
and effort, as well as their effects on organizational performance. Similarly, there would be 
value in examining whether leaders who receive elevated pay engage in other behaviors (e.g., 
displaying status symbols, exhibiting confidence) that may have a positive effect on 
perceptions of their charisma (indeed, the fact that in Study 2 the residual coefficient for the 
path from pay to charisma when controlling for personal identification is positive speaks to 
the possibility of simultaneously operating opposing effects). It is also important to note that 
the present indirect effects do not provide causal evidence for all paths. For instance, it is 
possible that identity leadership and charisma may also serve to increase individuals’ 
personal identification with the leaders, a possibility that future research should interrogate. 
We would also highlight that identity leadership is not necessarily a path to ‘good’ 
leadership. For instance, it is likely that (a) the extent to which individuals who identify with 
the leader also identify with the organization may depend on individuals beliefs about what 
the leader and the organization stand for (Sluss et al., 2012; Steffens et al., 2014) and that (b) 
the content of an identity (what people believe the group is about) will affect how members 
act when they identify with the group (so that in an unethical or hyper-competitive climate, 
shared identification may have counterproductive consequences).  
Third, the present work restricted its focus to an examination of responses to the pay 
of an organization’s most senior representatives and figureheads. Accordingly, the data do 
not allow us to make inferences about the generalizability of the present findings to other less 
senior leaders. Similarly, the present research does not shed light on responses to CEO pay 
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when a CEO is a person’s immediate supervisor. These are another interesting questions for 
future research to address. 
Finally, economic and psychological scientists have traditionally sought to answer 
questions from different perspectives and have placed emphasis on, and employed, unique 
methods and statistics to generate knowledge. That is, economists have tended to focus on 
behavior and used a suite of methods and statistics to address issues of endogeneity and 
causality, while psychologists have focused on people’s experiences and perceptions as well 
as behavior and used a variety of methods and statistics to shed light on phenomenology and 
co-occurrence of variables (as well as causal relationships). In economics (and to a lesser 
extent in psychology), issues of endogeneity and causality have been regarded as particularly 
important in evaluating evidence for or against a given claim.  
We certainly believe that well designed studies that can identify causal relationships 
are very valuable and that experiments are very suitable for this purpose. Nevertheless, it is 
also important to recognize that human psychology is complex where most behaviors, 
emotions, and perceptions, are determined not by single but by multiple causes. Furthermore, 
there is no ‘perfect’ study but only studies that are more or less good at answering the 
question they seek to answer (and providing the best evidence at the time) while being 
necessarily limited in being based on a sample observation of a subset of potentially relevant 
psychological processes. A study can never rule out, theoretically, that a different 
interpretation may be more accurate or, empirically, that a different variable from the one that 
is believed to be a cause may in fact be responsible for causing a phenomenon. This may be 
the case not only because we have not a measured a variable that is important but also 
because the current state of knowledge leaves us unaware of a third variable, or indeed 
because particular aspects of an independent variable are in fact the active ingredient (e.g., 
because people make sense of a variable in a different way than is assumed). Against this 
IDENTITY ECONOMICS MEETS IDENTITY LEADERSHIP 37 
background, we are likely to come closer to understanding the true nature of phenomena not 
by examining isolated effects but by developing integrative theory that comprises a network 
of falsifiable hypotheses (with theories standing in opposition to each other) and then by 
examining hypotheses not in isolation and with a single method but in comparison to each 
other using multiple complementary methods. 
Conclusion 
The pay that leaders receive for their effort and achievement is a topical issue for 
organizations and their members, with the dominant focus on the extent to which pay serves a 
motivating function for those who receive it. The present work expands upon previous 
research by using recently developed theories of identity economics and identity leadership in 
an attempt to provide novel insight into the consequences of CEO pay. In line with the radical 
tenets of these theories (and in ways that challenge traditional economic and psychological 
theory), the findings of two studies show that elevated CEO pay impacts followers’ 
perceptions of the extent to which they share identity with those leaders and that this is turn is 
associated with a sense that those leaders are neither ‘in it for us’ nor charismatic. Ironically, 
then, while elevated pay is typically justified by a desire to reward and inspire good 
leadership, it appears that it in fact achieves the very opposite. We would argue, however, 
that much of the power of the new models of economics and leadership that we have tested is 
precisely to expose such ironic effects — and thereby to encourage a deeper interrogation of 
the conventional economic and psychological wisdom by which contemporary organizational 
practice and social policy are guided.   
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Notes 
1. Analysis of leader charisma using the original 8-item scale (α=.93; including the 
additional items: “[This leader] is a charismatic person”; “[This leader] has a special 
gift for seeing what is worthwhile”; “[This leader] motivated people to see that they 
can do more than they think they can”; “[This leader] increases others’ optimism for 
the future”; “[This leader] gives people a sense of overall purpose”) yielded 
substantively identical results with an indirect effect of leader pay through personal 
identification to leader charisma, γ=–.18, SE=.04, 95%CIs [–.26,–.10], R2Model=.56.  
2. As in Study 1, analysis using the full 8-item scale yielded substantively identical 
results, indicating a significant indirect effect from leader pay through personal 
identification with the leader to leader charisma, γ=–.12, SE=.03, 95%CIs [–.19,–.06], 
R2Model=.72. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations between 
Variables 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Personal Identification with Leader 4.07 1.35 -     
2. Leaders’ Identity Leadership 6.09 0.86 .35** -    
3. Leader Charisma 6.07 0.88 .47** .63** -   
4. Social Dominance Orientation 2.39 1.29 .15** -.07 -.07 -  
5. Meritocracy Beliefs 4.10 0.59 .19** .14** .18** .11** - 
Note. N = 590; due to missing data in one case for meritocracy beliefs, the sample size is 
reduced to N = 589 for corresponding analyses.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Table 2. Study 1: Hierarchical regression analyses assessing effect of the experimental condition on personal identification with the leader 
(including sensitivity analysis with SDO and meritocracy beliefs as control variables) 
 Main analysis Sensitivity analysis  
(with controls as main effects) 
Sensitivity analysis  
(with controls as interaction effects) 
Variable b SE 95% CIs ß t b SE 95% CIs ß t b SE 95% CIs ß t 
Step 1                
Leader Pay Condition –.48 .11 –.70,–.27 –.18 4.38** –.48 .11 –.69,–.27 –.18 4.48** –.48 .11 –.69,–.27 –.18 4.48** 
Step 2                
SDO      .17 .05 .07, .28 .13 3.20** .14 .08 –.02, .29 .10 1.76† 
Meritocracy Beliefs      .23 .05 .12, .34 .17 4.25** .13 .08 –.03, .28 .09 1.56 
Step 3                
Leader Pay X SDO           .06 .11 –.15, .28 .03 .58 
Leader Pay X Meritocracy 
Beliefs 
          .19 .11 –.03, .40 .10 1.72† 
Model                
∆R2     .03**     .05**     .00 
R2     .03**     .08**     .08** 
Note. N = 590 for main analysis; due to missing data N = 589 for analysis including control variables; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; 
Variables are Z-standardized, while condition is dummy coded as 0 (low pay) and 1 (high pay).  
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01; 
 
 Table 3. Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations between 
Variables  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Leader Pay 2.39 1.56 -      
2. Personal Identification with Leader 4.02 1.70 –.19** -     
3. Identity Leadership 5.31 1.43 –.09† .65** -    
4. Leader Charisma 5.14 1.36 .01 .66** .76** -   
4. Social Dominance Orientation 2.42 1.22 .06 .13** –.03 –.01 -  
6. Meritocracy Beliefs 4.18 .58 .01 .31** .34** .27** .18** - 
Note. N = 444. 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01; 
 
Table 4. Study 2: Hierarchical regression analyses assessing effect of leader pay on personal identification with the leader (including sensitivity 
analysis with SDO and meritocracy beliefs as control variables) 
 Main analysis Sensitivity analysis  
(with controls as main effects) 
Sensitivity analysis  
(with controls as interaction effects) 
Variable b SE 95% CIs ß t b SE 95% CIs ß t b SE 95% CIs ß t 
Step 1                
Leader Pay –.32 .08 –.47,–.16 –.19 4.01** –.33 .08 –.48,–.18 –.20 4.39** –.34 .08 –.49,–.19 –.20 4.45** 
Step 2                
SDO      .15 .08 –.01, .30 .09 1.89† .14 .08 –.01, .29 .08 1.84† 
Meritocracy Beliefs      .50 .08 .35, .65 .30 6.56** .51 .08 .36, .66 .30 6.61** 
Step 3                
Leader Pay X SDO           .09 .07 –.05, .23 .06 1.30 
Leader Pay X Meritocracy 
Beliefs 
          .08 .07 –.06, .23 .05 1.15 
Model                
∆R2     .04**     .10**     .01 
R2     .04**     .14**     .15** 
Note. N = 444; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; Variables are Z-standardized. 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01; 
  
Figure 1. Summary biographies of Ruben Martin for low-paid (left) and high-paid (right) 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
Biography of a Leader who is Low-Paid                        Biography of a Leader who is High-Paid
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Figure 2. Study 1: Indirect effect from experimental condition leader pay through perceiver 
personal identification with leader to (a) identity leadership and (b) charisma. Asterisks 
indicate significant coefficients (**p < .01). Numbers in parentheses are path coefficients 
after controlling for follower identification with leader. 
  
–
+
Charisma
Personal Identification 
with Leader
Leader Pay Condition
[low pay = 0; 
high pain = 1]
Identity Leadership:
Cultivating Collective 
Identity
+
a = –.48, SE = .11, CIs [–.70, –.27]  
b1 = .22, SE = .22, CIs [.17, .26]
b2 = .30, SE = .02, CIs [.26, .35]
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Figure 3. Study 2: Indirect effect from leader pay through perceiver personal identification 
with leader to (a) identity leadership and (b) charisma. Asterisks indicate significant 
coefficients (**p < .01). Numbers in parentheses are path coefficients after controlling for 
follower identification with leader. 
 
–
+
Charisma
Personal Identification 
with Leader
Leader Pay
Identity Leadership:
Cultivating Collective 
Identity
+
a = –.20, SE = .05, CIs [–.34, –.10]  
b1 = .55, SE = .03, CIs [.49, .61]
b2 = .55, SE = .03, CIs [.49, .60]
